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Recent Cases
CONTRACrS-CONSIDERATION-MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION-The plain-
tiffs, partners d/b/a Jacks Creek Mining Company, entered into an
agreement with the defendants, partners d/b/a Virgie Coal Com-
pany, on March 29, 1949, whereby the defendants promised to sell
and deliver to the plaintiffs all the coal mined from a particular
mine in Pike County. The plaintiffs agreed to accept "all coal which
their equipment would permit them to process at the best advantage"
and which "market conditions will permit them to handle," at 4.50
a ton, subject to revision by mutual consent. The plaintiffs further
agreed to attempt to find a market for the coal they were unable to
handle, in order that the defendants might maintain a weekly opera-
tion of five days, with the understanding that the defendants were
free to sell their coal to others only if the plaintiffs were unsuccessful
in their effort to find a buyer and could not accept the coal them-
selves. Moreover, the plaintiffs were given the right to reject any coal
or cancel the agreement if in their opinion the coal was not "clean
and merchantable." Unless cancellation was made, the agreement
was to remain in force for a term of one year. The parties operated
under this agreement until February 11, 1950, after which the de-
fendants refused to deliver any more coal. The plaintiffs brought
this action to recover the amount of profits which they alleged would
have been made by- them had the coal been delivered as promised
under the contract. The case was referred to a special commissioner
who ruled that the contract was unenforceable oi the theory that it
was unilateral, and therefore lacked mutuality of obligation. Excep-
tions entered to the report when filed were overruled by the Circuit
Court of Pike County and the complaint was dismissed. On appeal,
held: Affirmed. The contract constituted nothing more than a con-
tinuing offer to sell by the defendants which could be revoked at any
time. Baber v. Lay, 305 S.W. 2d 912 (Ky. 1957).
Mutuality of obligation and consideration are often confused.1
While consideration is essential to any contract, mutuality of obliga-
tion is not, unless the want of mutuality would leave one party without
1 "In the opinion of this and other courts, there is frequently a misuse of
legal terminology in the discussion of ... mutuality. it is sometimes said that a
contract is unenforceable because it . . . lacks mutuality, when what is meant
is that it is unenforceable because of want of consideration." Jackson v. Pepper
Gas Co., 280 Ky. 226, 229, 133 S.W. 2d 91, 93 (1939).
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a valid or available consideration for his promise. Since in a bilateral
contract the mutual promises of the parties constitute the considera-
tion, these promises must be binding on both parties, or the contract
fails for want of consideration. In a unilateral contract, where the
performance of one party constitutes the consideration for the promise
of the other, mutuality of obligation is not essential, and the agreement
is enforceable, despite a lack of mutuality2
The doctrine of mutuality of obligation appears therefore merely
to be one aspect of the rule that mutual promises may constitute
consideration for each other, a means of expressing the idea that each
party to a bilateral contract is under a legal duty to the other; each
has made a promise and each is an obligor3
Consideration is something which has value in the eyes of the
law. As a practical matter, a promise does not have value in the eyes
of the law unless two things are true: (1) the promised performance
has legal value; and (2) the promise itself is legally binding on the
promisor.4 To say that a bilateral agreement is unenforceable for
want of mutuality is, therefore, to say that the promise of at least
one of the parties lacks one of the essential elements for it to provide
sufficient consideration for the promise of the other party. In a ma-
jority of instances, the question is whether the promise is legally
binding, rather than whether the promised performance has legal
value.
There are several reasons why a promisor may not be bound to
perform. Not all of these should form the ground on which an agree-
ment can properly be held unenforceable for want of mutuality.5
However, there are many instances where the promisor is not legally
bound by his promise which the Kentucky Court has long recognized,
and rightly so, as within the scope of the doctrine of mutuality.6
2 Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, 1 F. 2d 687, 688 (3rd Cir. 1924);
Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 801 Ill. 102, 108, 138
N.E. 711, 714 (1921).
3 1 Corbin, Contracts sec. 152 (1950).
4 Williston, "Effect of One Void Promise in a Bilateral Agreement," 25
Colum. L. Rev. 857, 864, 866.
5 An outstanding example of a situation outside the scope of mutuality is
that which occurred in Venters v. Stewart, 261 S.W. 2d 444 (Ky. 1953), cited
in the principle case. There a "promise" to fill an order for goods was made by
a salesman subject to the approval of the head office. Since what was purported
to be the promise was made in response to an offer prior to an effective act of
acceptance by the person to be bound thereby, no contract had yet come into
existence, and there was no need to inquire into the lack of consideration. How-
ever, although the court held that such an arrangement failed for want of an
effective acceptance, it gave as an additional reason for its decision that the con-
tract was unenforceable for lack of mutuality.6 For example, where a married woman entered into a contract for the
sale of her land without her husband joining therein, as was required by statute,
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Where the terms of the agreement give one or both parties the
absolute power, either express or implied, to reject or withhold
performance, or to terminate the contract, there is no mutuality of
obligation which will uphold the agreement -insofar as it remains
executory. The right of cancellation without cause in effect relieves
the party retaining such right of its legal obligation to perform its
promise, and renders such a promise insufficient consideration for the
return promise of the other.7
However, this result does not follow where the power to reject
performance or to terminate the agreement is subject to conditions
or to the exercise of reasonable discretion. For instance, the right
of one party to reject goods tendered which fail to meet stated specifi-
cations, where such right cannot be arbitrarily exercised, does not
render the contract unenforceable for want of mutuality. The per-
son with such power is still bound to perform his promise and is ex-
cused by the unsatisfactory performance of the other party, as deter-
mined by a fixed or reasonable standard.8
In the agreement with which the court was concerned in the prin-
cipal case, the plaintiffs were given the right to reject any coal or
cancel the agreement if in their opinion the coal was not "dean and
merchantable." A fair interpretation of this provision would deter-
mine that it granted a conditional power of rejection or termination
subject to the exercise of reasonable discretion, and in and of itself
was not enough to render the contract unenforceable for want of
mutuality of obligation. However, the court declined to discuss
this point, as it found another basis on which to decide the issue-
neither promise was binding on the party who made it, and there-
fore neither could constitute sufficient consideration for the promise
of the other.
The court first considered the promise of the defendant coal
company to sell and deliver to the plaintiff all coal which was mined
the court held that the agreement was void and unenforceable for lack of
mutuality, even after she had obtained a divorce. Brown v. Allen, 204 Ky. 76,
268 S.W. 717 (1924). She was not legally bound to carry out her promise to
sell, and her promise was not sufficient consideration for the return promise of
the prospective purchaser.
7 Combs v. Hazard Ice & Storage Co., 218 Ky. 29, 290 S.W. 1035 (1927);
Daniel Boone Coal Co. v. Miller, 186 Ky. 561, 217 S.W. 666 (1920); Second
National Bank of Ashland v. Rouse, 142 Ky. 612, 134 S.W. 1121 (1911); Lowe v.
Ayer-Lord Tie Co., 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1302, 95 S.W. 883 (1906).
8 City of Bowling Green v. Knight, 216 Ky. 838, 840-41, 288 S.W. 741,
742 (1926). See also Jay Dreker Corp. v. Delco Appliance Corp., 93 F. 2d 275
(2nd Cir. 1937); Marrinan Medical Supply, Inc. v. Fort Dodge Serum Co., 47
F. 2d 458 (8th Cir. 1931); Hunt v. Stimson, 23 F. 2d 447 (6th Cir. 1928);
The Fair v. Estate Stove Co., 246 I1. App. 558 (1927); 17 C.J.S., Contracts sec.
100(d) at 451-452 (1939).
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from a particular mine. It came to the "inescapable conclusion"
that this promise did not create any legal obligation on the defend-
ants since they could at their whim cause production to cease with-
out incurring any liability to the plaintiffs. This was true because
they failed to commit themselves to mine, or to continue to operate
for the duration of the agreement, and, moreover, because no penalty
was provided for a failure to deliver the amount of coal which the
plaintiffs could profitably handle.
This raises the question whether a promise by a producer to sell
to another his total output is legally binding on the promisor, and,
when given for valuable consideration, creates a binding contract.
The weight of authority would support an affirmative answer. Some
of the authorities supporting this position hold that such a promise
is not illusory, but binds the promisor not to sell any of his output to
a third party. The producer is limited to the option between sell-
ing to the promisee or not selling at all. Even though the promisor
does not in addition agree to maintain his production at a stated
level, but retains the privilege of closing down the works and pro-
ducing nothing, he has given sufficient consideration in promising
to sell his entire output, whatever it may be, to the promisee and
none others. He may relieve himself of any performance and still
keep his promise, but only by doing something in itself a legal detri-
ment-going out of business.9
Other courts have used another interpretation to hold that a
promise to sell total output is legally binding on the promisor. From
the business situation and the conduct of the parties, they have implied
an obligation to continue production in good faith in the manner
anticipated, realizing that the producer may for reasonable cause
cease to maintain his output.10
Following this line of reasoning, the Kentucky Court has here-
tofore consistently enforced contracts wherein one party promised to
9 1 Corbin, Contracts sec. 158 at 524 (1950); 1 Williston, Contracts sec.
104A at 355 (rev. ed. 1936). See also Ramey Lumber Co. v. John Schroeder
Lumber Co., 237 F. 39 (7th Cir. 1916); Allen v. Field, 130 F. 641 (2nd Cir.
1094); Kentucky Tobacco Products Co. v. Lucas, 5 F. 2d 723 (W.D. Ky. 1925);
Green v. Lovejoy, 155 Minn. 241, 193 N.W. 173 (1923); Walker v. Mason, 272
Pa. 315, 116 A. 305 (1922). Cf. Hollandsworth v. William Mead Tie Co., 26
F. 2d 33 (6th Cir. 1928); Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corp., 279 F. 19,
24 (5th Cir. 1922).
30 1 Williston, Contracts sec. 104A at 857 (rev. ed. 1936). In Fayette-
Kanawha Coal Co. v. Lake & Export Coal Corp., 91 W.Va. 132, 112 S.E. 222,
225 (1922), the court used this principle to uphold a contract whereby one party
promised to deliver to another all coal mined from given mines, saying: 'The
plaintiff was obliged to operate its mines during the term provided by the con-
tract in the usual and ordinary way in good faith, and was required to deliver to
the defendant the coal produced by such operation."
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deliver to a tie company all the railroad ties which the promisor
could produce (total output) from his timber lands, or from those of
a given area, and the tie company promised to receive and pay for
all ties delivered. In Mitchell-Taylor Tie Co. v. Whitaker,"1 the
court found that a fair interpretation of the contract bound the
plaintiff to exercise "reasonable diligence" under the circumstances
to produce ties and deliver them to the defendant. If he declined to do
so, or furnished a lesser number than he should have by exercising
reasonable diligence, there was no doubt in the mind of the court
that the company would have a cause against him for breach of con-
tract. "In other words," the court said, "this contract was mutually
binding upon both of the parties and . . . each of them was obliged
to perform it in a reasonable manner."' 2
Conceivably, there is no vast difference between coal-mining and
tie-making which would prevent the application of the principle laid
down in these cases to a promise to sell and deliver total output of
a coal mine. Yet the Court of Appeals has supposedly declined to do
so. In Springton Coal Co. v. Bowling,13 the court held that a contract
whereby the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiffs 77 c per ton for
each and every ton of coal they removed out of two entries to the
defendant's mine, was unilateral (in the sense that it bound only one
party) and therefore unenforceable.
In the principal case, the court stated that the Springton case
dealt with a total output contract, and that, as such, the ruling of the
court presented there had been criticized as inconsistent with the
weight of authority. However, it attempted to distinguish the two
cases on the grounds that the present case was not a total output case.' 4
11158 Ky. 651, 166 S.W. 193 (1914).
12 Id. at 653, 166 S.W. at 194. Cf. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. 0. T. O'Bannon
& Co., 164 Ky. 34, 174 S.W. 783 (1915); Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Coyle,
123 Ky. 859, 99 S.W. (1907) (opinion on rehearing), original opinion 123
Ky. 854, 97 S.W. 772 (1906): "The contract bound Coyle to deliver as many
ties as he could get out by ordinary care and diligence in the time fixed and
was not lacking in mutuality."
13228 Ky. 317, 14 S.W. 2d 1082 (1929).
14 A better way in which the court might have distinguished the Springton
case from the Baber case, and also the tie company cases, would have been to
recognize that the former in effect dealt with a contract for the employment of
the plaintiffs to work the defendant's mine for an indeterminate period, payment
for which was to be made on a piece-work basis-per ton of coal delivered at
the portal. As such, it was not a true total output contract-there was not the
same legal detriment to be incurred by ceasing to "produce", for there would be
other employment the plaintiffs would be free to engage in. What is more
important, there was no definite or determinable period during which the plain-
tiffs were bound to perform their promised work. An analysis of the language
of the agreement reveals no obligation on the part of the plaintiffs to mine any
specified quantity of coal, or to take all the coal from any specified area of the
mine, nor to work for any given length of time. Rather, they could cease mining
at any time they saw fit without incurring any liability to the other party.
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While the plaintiff did not promise to buy the total output, one must
admit that the promise of the defendant was a promise to sell and
deliver his total output for a specific term. If given in return for
valuable consideration, it should have been sufficient to constitute a
legally enforceable obligation on the producer. Then the crucial
question would have been whether there were any promises or per-
formances moving from the plaintiffs to the defendants which could
have been deemed sufficient consideration for the promise of the
defendants.
The most likely consideration for a promise of this type, and the
one that the court has been most ready to hold sufficient, is a return
promise to receive and pay for the total output of the producer on
given terms at a set or determinable rate.15 The court in the present
case recognized, however, that the absence of a return promise of this
kind does not automatically render the agreement unenforceable, if
another promise of valuable performance legally binding upon the
promisor be given in its stead. It even suggested a type of promise
which would meet this requirement: "[A] promise to buy total needs
or requirements of a business from a producer is by the weight of
authority a valid promise and constitutes sufficient consideration for
a return promise, .".'."16 At the same time, the court recognized a quali-
fication which, in light of its interpretation of the plaintiffs' prom-
ises, prevented it from using this doctrine to uphold the enforce-
ability of the contract. It stated: "[Y] et, where the determination of
the amount needed or required is left entirely up to the will of the
purchaser, such an amount must be considered too indefinite to
enable enforcement of the contract."' 7
The keystone of the court's reasoning was that the plaintiffs had
not bound themselves to buy only from the defendants, but that
they were at liberty under the arrangement to purchase freely from
other producers. This being the case, the amount of coal the plain-
15 Ayer-Lord Tie Co. v. 0. T. O'Bannon & Co., 164 Ky. 34, 174 S.W. 783(1915); Mitchell-Taylor Tie Co. v. Whitaker, 158 Ky. 651, 166 S.W. 193 (1914).
See also Fayette-Kanawha Coal Co. v. Lake & Export Coal Corp., 91 W. Va. 132,
112 S.E. 222 (1922).
16 Baber v. Lay, 805 S.W. 2d 912. 914. See also Heidelberg Brewing Co.
v. E. F. Pritchard Co., 297 Ky. 7818, 180 S.W. 2d 849 (1944). This is especially
true where the nature of the purchaser's business is such as to make the quantity
subject to reasonably accurate estimate. Fowler's Bootery v. Selby Shoe Co.,: 273
Ky. 670, 117 S.W. 2d 931 (1938) (dictum).
17 Baber v. Lay, supra, note 16 at 914; 1 Corbin, Contracts sec. 156 at 509
(1950). Cf. Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. F. G. Walker Co., 156 Ky. 6, 160 S.W. 777
(1913); Fowler's Bootery v. Selby Shoe Co., supra note 16. The same principle
applies in a contract of employment, where the employer is bound to retain the
services of an employee only so long as it desires to keep goods on the market
in a certain district. Stanley v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 223 Ky. 688, 4 S.W. 2d
732 (1928).
[Vol. 47,
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tiffs might need or require would be conditioned not only by the
fluctuations in the market, but also by their purchases from other
companies. The decision to buy from the defendants would be gov-
erned to a large extent by the subjective will of the plaintiffs and
might even approach the vanishing point. The court felt that under
this arrangement the plaintiffs bound themselves only to the extent
they desired to be bound. The promise made by them was at most
an illusory promise to purchase, and it was not sufficient considera-
tion for the defendant's promise to sell all coal mined by them to
the plaintiffs. The promise of the defendants, not binding upon them
for lack of consideration, became a standing offer to sell. Accept-
ance of each delivery by the plaintiffs created a series of separate
obligations, but the offer nevertheless remained open to revocation
by the defendants.' 8
On the facts, this decision insofar as it holds that the plaintiffs'
promise was not legally binding on them represents an instance where
an agreement was held unenforceable for lack of mutuality of obliga-
tion in a case where the doctrine was designed to apply. However, in
reaching its decision, the court gave an indication that it still re-
gards a promise to sell total output for a determinable period as not
legally binding upon the promisor, and therefore incapable of form-
ing the basis of a bilateral contract. Such a position is contrary to
the weight of authority, and contrary to previous decisions of the
court (excluding the Springton case, which, it is submitted, was right
in its result but wrong in its reasons). 19
If in the principal case, the plaintiffs had promised to deal entirely
with the defendants, a strong case could have been made out that
this promise bound the plaintiffs either to buy all the coal they
could profitably handle from the defendants, the quantity to be
determined objectively by market conditions, or to accept the alterna-
tive of handling none and going out of business. Moreover, they
might have been said to have been expected to continue operations
in good faith in much the same way as in the total output cases
previously mentioned. 20 However, here the plaintiffs did not bind
themselves to deal exclusively with the defendants, and therefore their
promise to take all the coal that they could reasonably handle, even
when taken together with the somewhat indefinite proposal to "at-
tempt" to find other markets for any coal they could not handle,
did not bind the plaintiffs to performance. Therefore it was not
18 See 1 Corbin, Contracts see. 157 (1950).
19 See note 14 supra.
20 1 Williston, Contracts see. 104A (rev. ed. 1936).
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sufficient consideration for the return promise of the defendants to
sell and deliver the total output of their mines.
It is a matter for conjecture what the attitude of the court will be
in future cases involving a promise to sell total output. It is to be
hoped that the court will bend to the dictates of business conveni-
ence and hold enforceable an agreement wherein such a promise is
given in consideration for a return promise to buy the entire output
or the total needs of the purchaser.
John T. Bondurant
CONTACTS-QuASI-CONTPRAcT-RIGHT OF TOBACco BOARD OF TRADE TO
REGULATE NON-MEMBER WAREHOusEs-Congress, under its power to
regulate interstate commerce, enacted the Tobacco Inspection Act' to
provide for a uniform system of classification and inspection of to-
bacco to be sold at auction markets. 2 Pursuant to this Act no tobacco
may be sold on a designated market until it has been inspected by an
authorized representative of the Secretary of Agriculture.3 Lexington
is a designated market. To assist in carrying out the purpose of the
Act the Secretary is authorized, under the Act, to cooperate with
local organizations, such as boards of trade.4 The Secretary has been
cooperating with the Lexington Tobacco Board of Trade, which is an
association of warehouse organizations5 and persons engaged in the
same general business acting together for their mutual benefit in
the sale and purchase of tobacco. Of the twenty-eight tobacco ware-
houses located in Lexington, the owners of twenty-one are members
of this association. Appellants are owners and operators of four of
the non-member warehouses. The Board adopted regulations pre-
scribing the order in whcih the sets of buyers of the tobacco would
visit the Lexington warehouses, allotting selling time to each ware-
house, prescribing the amount of space allowed per basket of to-
bacco, and prohibiting selling of tobacco in driveways. The appellants,
in a declaratory judgment action, challenged the right of the Board
to exercise such control over them, as non-members of the Board.
The lower court held that the Board could exercise such control
over non-member warehouses so long as it did not do so in a "dis-
criminatory, unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious manner." Upon
149 Stat 785 (1935), 7 U.S.C. sec. 511 (1952).
2 Id. see. 511a.
3 Id. sec. 511d.4 Id. see. 511m.
5 Not organized under statutory authority as in some states. E.g., see Co-
operative Warehouse, Inc. v. Lumberton Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc., 242
N.C. 123, 87 S.E. 2d 25 (1955).
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